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ARTICLES
RED LIONS, TIGERS AND BEARS: BROADCAST
CONTENT REGULATION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
Charles D. Ferris and Terrence J. Leahy*
No issue in communications law has inspired such passionate controversy
in recent years as the Fairness Doctrine. From its formal implementation in
19491 until its elimination by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC or Commission) in 1987,2 the doctrine required broadcasters to pres-
ent contrasting viewpoints on controversial issues of public importance.
3
Although a unanimous United States Supreme Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of this requirement in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,4 the pol-
icy became a lightening rod for criticism by those who contended that it
impermissibly interfered with the editorial discretion of broadcast licensees.
Eventually the Commission itself adopted the view that the Fairness Doc-
trine neither served the public interest nor passed muster under the first
* Charles D. Ferris, Esq. and Terrence J. Leahy, Esq., are with the law firm of Mintz,
Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky & Popeo, P.C., Washington, D.C. and Boston, Massachusetts.
Mr. Ferris was Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission from 1977-1981.
1. Report, Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949). The doctrine
has roots that precede the 1949 report. See Great Lakes Broadcasting, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32
(1929), rev'd on other grounds, 37 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930).
2. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 867 F.2d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(directing
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) to consider petitioner's con-
stitutional challenge to Fairness Doctrine).
3. 47 C.F.R. § 73.1910 (1987). See Report, The Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interests Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d
1 (1974), recon. denied, 58 F.C.C.2d 691 (1976), aff'd in part and remanded in part, National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasters v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 926 (1978) [hereinafter 1974 Fairness Report]; Report, Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of
the Commission's Rules and Regulations Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obliga-
tions of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143 (1985), petition for review dismissed as moot,
Radio-Television News Directors Ass'n v. FCC, 831 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
1985 Fairness Report].
4. 395 U.S. 367 (1968).
Catholic University Law Review
amendment.5 In Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently upheld the Commis-
sion's public interest finding, but declined to address the constitutional
issue.6
Ironically, the fruits of broadcasters' long-sought victory over the Fairness
Doctrine have been bittersweet. The Commission's decision to scuttle the
policy---on the same day it sent Congress a report that legislators had re-
quested discussing possible alternatives to the Fairness Doctrine'-has trig-
gered a sharp dispute with Congress over the future course of
communications policy that continues to simmer today. In response to a
decision by the D. C. Circuit that the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, did not embody the Fairness Doctrine,8 Congress, by a wide mar-
gin, enacted a bill to codify the policy,9 only to witness President Reagan's
veto of the measure as an impermissible intrusion on the constitutional
rights of broadcasters.'0 The Syracuse decision has, however, opened the
door to new legislation on the Fairness Doctrine. " An irritated Congress
has barred broadcasters from pursuing any other items on their congres-
sional agenda, including new mandatory carriage legislation' 2 and revisions
5. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5052, 5057-58; see also 1985 Fairness Report,
supra note 3.
6. 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
7. Report, Inquiry into Section 73.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning Alternatives to the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees,
2 FCC Rcd 5272 (1987), recon. denied, 3 FCC Rd 2050 (1988) [hereinafter Alternatives Re-
port]; see Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd at 5059 n.4.
8. Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
9. S. 742, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. H4160 (daily ed. June 3, 1987).
10. Veto of the Fairness in Broadcasting Act of 1987, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 715
(June 19, 1987).
11. In the wake of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit's affirmance of the FCC's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine in Syracuse Peace Council, Con-
gress has moved quickly to curtail FCC discretion by codifying the Doctrine. As this Article
went to press, the legislation codifying the Fairness Doctrine awaited final passage on the
floors of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. See H.R. 315, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1989); Fairness Bill Gets House Committee Nod, Multichannel News, Apr. 17, 1989, at
28; see also S. 577, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Fairness Doctrine Bill Sent to Senate Floor,
Communications Daily, Apr. 19, 1989, at 6. The Department of Justice has indicated that it
views legislation codifying the Fairness Doctrine as constitutionally offensive, and that it will
urge President Bush to veto any such enactment. See Justice Dept. Urges Bush to Veto Fairness
Doctrine Bill, Communications Daily, Apr. 10, 1989, at 1.
12. The mandatory carriage or "must carry" rules required cable television system opera-
tors, upon request and without compensation, to transmit to subscribers certain over-the-air
broadcast signals that were significantly viewed in the community. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.57-.61
(1984). The D.C. Circuit declared these rules unconstitutional in 1985. Quincy Cable TV,
Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986). In an attempt
[Vol. 38:299
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to the comparative renewal process, 3 until legislators obtain satisfaction on
the Fairness Doctrine. Frustration at their inability to make any headway
on legislative initiatives has led some broadcasters' trade groups to consider
softening their opposition to Fairness Doctrine legislation.' 4
Aside from legislative strategy, the controversy over the Fairness Doctrine
has raised fundamental issues about the role of the government in regulating
broadcast content and has led to a watershed period in judicial, legislative,
and administrative policymaking. The Supreme Court soon will have an op-
portunity to take a fresh look at the Fairness Doctrine, either in the Syracuse
case or in the context of a challenge to new legislation. The Court could use
the occasion to reexamine Red Lion. "S Emboldened by their success in per-
suading the Commission to eliminate the policy, some have called into ques-
to accommodate the court's concerns, the Commission adopted a new set of scaled-down must
carry rules, but these also were declared void by the appeals court. Report and Order, Amend-
ment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broadcast Sig-
nals by Cable Television Systems, I FCC Rcd 864 (1986), vacated, Century Communications
Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1988).
13. The comparative renewal process permits challengers to file competing applications
against an incumbent licensee's renewal application, forcing a comparative hearing in order to
determine whether grant of the incumbent's or challenger's application would most effectively
promote the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 309 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 47 C.F.R. § 73.3516(e)
(1987). The Commission initiated an inquiry into possible changes in the comparative renewal
process. Second Further Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Formulation
of Policies and Rules Relating to Broadcast Renewal Applicants, Competing Applicants, and
Other Participants to the Comparative Renewal Process and to the Prevention of Abuses of
the Renewal Process, 3 FCC Rcd 5179 (1988) [hereinafter Comparative Renewal Inquiry]. As
a result of this Inquiry, the Commission readopted a rule that limits the amount a license
renewal applicant can pay to settle with a petitioner who seeks denial of the applicant's license
renewal. The rule limits settlement payments to the challenging petitioner's costs of prosecut-
ing the petition to deny. FCC Modifies Its Procedures to Prevent Abuse of Its Comparative
Renewal Process and Requests Further Comment to Clarify the Comparative Criteria, FCC
News Release No. 2240 (Mar. 30, 1989).
14. After much internal debate, the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has reaf-
firmed its commitment to block Fairness Doctrine legislation. The Association of Independent
Television Stations, however, has apparently sided with Congress. See e.g., FCC Upheld on
Fairness,- Codification Urged, Multichannel News, Feb. 20, 1989, at 22. Fairness Doctrine, TV
News & the First Amendment, Variety, Nov. 30, 1988, at 69, col. 1 (NAB expected to recon-
sider its earlier opposition to reimposition of the Fairness Doctrine); NAB Considering
Whether To Pursue New Fairness Doctrine Battle, Communications Daily, Nov. 29, 1988, at I
(same); Broadcasters Express Indifference to Fairness Law Possibility, Radio & Records, Nov.
4, 1988, at 6 (same); NAB Considers Easing Fairness Doctrine Stance, Electronic Media, Oct. 3,
1988, at 32 (same).
15. See supra note 4. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the
Supreme Court noted that it was disinclined to reconsider its Red Lion rationale absent "some
signal from the Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far
that some revisions of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." Id. at 377 n. 11.
Many view the Commission's repeal of the Fairness Doctrine as just such a message to the
Court.
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tion the bedrock principle that broadcasters are public trustees. 16
Criticism of the public trustee theory of broadcast regulation has two pri-
mary elements. First, critics frequently argue that because of rapid innova-
tion and technological change, the spectrum scarcity that gave rise to the
public trustee concept of broadcast regulation is no longer relevant. Not
only has the Commission licensed significantly more broadcast stations than
it had twenty years ago, but the widespread availability of news and other
information from many other sources ensures the public's exposure to a vari-
ety of viewpoints. 7 Second, critics of the public trustee theory rest their
case on the United States Constitution. The first amendment, they claim,
forbids the government from dictating the content of any material broadcast
over the airwaves. Any attempt to instill meaning into the public interest
standard by overseeing the content of programming by broadcast licensees
will invite censorship and thereby erode first amendment values.' 8
In a thought-provoking essay, Timothy B. Dyk recently explored what
might happen if the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional all govern-
ment control of broadcast content. 9 Through a fictitious dialogue between
a proponent of the "old order" and advocates of a new regulatory regime,
Mr. Dyk speculates on the legal issues that would arise as a consequence of a
hypothetical decision he christens Red Lion . The author appears to con-
16. The Communications Act of 1934 requires the Federal Communications Commission
to regulate broadcasting in a manner that will promote the "public interest, convenience and
necessity." See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1982 & Supp. 1 1983) (Commission may take certain
actions "as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires"); id. § 307 (Commission may
grant station licenses "if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be served thereby"). In
NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943), the Supreme Court ruled that the Commission is
not bound to act merely as a traffic officer, policing the wave lengths to guard against undesir-
able interference. Because the electromagnetic spectrum cannot accommodate all who wish to
broadcast over it, the Commission may take affirmative steps to ensure that licensees provide
the best possible service to their communities. Id. at 215-17. The principle that the Commis-
sion should require broadcasters to operate in the public interest, as public trustees, has been
the cornerstone of broadcast regulation ever since. See, e.g., Office of Communication of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966)("After nearly five
decades of operation the broadcast industry does not seem to have grasped the simple fact that
a broadcast license is a public trust subject to termination for breach of duty.").
17. See, e.g., Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60
TEX. L. REV. 207, 236-41 (1982); 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 3, at 196-221; Syracuse
Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043, 5053-54 (1987), aff'd, Nos. 87-1516, (D.C. Cir. Feb 10,
1989); Alternatives Report, supra note 7, at 5290-91.
18. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 3, at 190-92; Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC
Rcd at 5052-57. In Syracuse Peace Council, despite its decision to eliminate the Fairness Doc-
trine, the Commission reaffirmed that it could impose conditions on licenses in furtherance of
the public interest standard and that it could continue to "license broadcasters in the public
interest, convenience, and necessity." Id. at 5055.
19. Dyk, Full First Amendment Freedom for Broadcasters: The Industry as Eliza on the
Ice and Congress as the Friendly Overseer, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 299 (1988).
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Red Lions, Tigers and Bears
clude that, as a matter of constitutional law, Congress could grant existing
broadcasters essentially permanent licenses, provided that they comply with
the FCC's regulations unrelated to program content, as a means of promot-
ing industry stability and preserving first amendment values. As a practical
matter, Mr. Dyk suggests that broadcasters will be unable to advance their
regulatory agenda unless they improve their relations with Congress. He
argues that continuing to urge the courts to confer on broadcasters broad
first amendment protections comparable to those enjoyed by the print press
eventually will result in more deference from Congress.20
The author's essay raises the prospect of a "brave new world" for broad-
casters, one in which they would enjoy freedom from all government content
regulation. Yet many broadcasters fear the consequences of "full" first
amendment rights. They recognize that, although government regulation
exacts certain obligations, it also confers benefits. The quid pro quo for free
and exclusive use of electromagnetic frequencies has been that the broad-
caster must serve the needs and interests of its community of license. These
groups fear that upsetting this historical bargain will have unintended conse-
quences, including far-reaching changes in the manner in which the govern-
ment allocates spectrum and regulates the industry.2
This Article offers a response to Mr. Dyk's'essay and provides some
thoughts on how a limited degree of government oversight of broadcast con-
tent can be justified in an era of technological change. The first section of
this Article's response discusses what full first amendment rights would
mean in the context of broadcast regulation. Proposals to eliminate all gov-
ernment involvement in broadcast subject matter ignore the history of
broadcast regulation. By allocating spectrum, the FCC necessarily makes
decisions about the content of the information disseminated over the air-
waves. The second section of this response addresses whether the need to
maintain industry stability in a post-Red Lion environment would justify a
decision to maintain the licenses of existing licensees for an indefinite period
of time. Marketplace solutions will by no means automatically lead to re-
sults that serve the public interest. In any case, to attempt to preserve the
stability of the broadcast industry would conflict with the free market theo-
ries recently used to justify widespread deregulation of broadcasting. The
conclusion of the Article discusses Mr. Dyk's suggestion that the way for
20. Id. at 326-27.
21. See, e.g., INTV" 'Fairness' Cost Too High, Variety, Nov. 30, 1988, at 70, col. 4. The
Association of Independent Television Stations believes the price for getting rid of the Fairness
Doctrine was too high. In this organization's view, the pursuit of full "print model" freedom
threatens the traditional bargain in which broadcasting receives free use of the public airwaves
in return for service attuned to the needs of the community. Id.
1989]
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broadcasters to heighten their influence in Congress is to press for full first
amendment protections.
Like Dorothy and her friends in The Wizard of Oz, broadcasters have
tended to perceive government regulators-Congressmen as well as the
Commission staff-as the unseen "lions, tigers and bears" who stifle creativ-
ity, interfere with their first amendment rights, and curtail their editorial
freedom. The perception in Congress, however, is that broadcasters repeat-
edly attempt to preserve the benefits of regulation while shirking their re-
sponsibilities. If broadcasters were found to have full first amendment
rights, Congress would be justified in expecting compensation for broadcast-
ers' use of the electromagnetic spectrum.
I. FREE AT LAST: FULL FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM
FOR BROADCASTERS?
In his essay, Mr. Dyk explores the consequences of a hypothetical
Supreme Court ruling that broadcasters have the same first amendment
rights as those enjoyed by the print press. After describing the current state
of broadcast content regulation,22 the author posits that the Supreme Court
has overruled Red Lion in a case he names Red Lion . Through a hypo-
thetical dialogue between a proponent of the old order, named G, and sev-
eral adherents to a new vision of broadcasters' constitutional rights, named
B and BB, the author raises some of the issues that would result if the Court
declared unconstitutional all Commission content regulation of protected
speech.23
The debate begins as G, the proponent of the public interest standard,
warns that broadcasters will live to regret the new decision. Congress, he
says, will undoubtedly undertake a major revision of the statutory scheme
that will entail auctioning frequencies or distributing them by means of a
lottery.24 B, the broadcast representative who favors full first amendment
rights, responds that Congress would be forbidden from withdrawing broad-
cast licenses because the government may not deny a privilege for an uncon-
stitutional reason. 25 To the contrary, G asserts, Congress would be free to
22. Dyk, supra note 19, at 301-08.
23. Id. at 312-27.
24. Id. at 313. Under the Bush Administration, the Commission evidently has embraced
this perspective. It recently proposed replacing the comparative hearing process for selecting
commercial broadcast licensees with a lottery system. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Allow the Selection From Among Competing Ap-
plicants for New AM, FM and Television Stations by Random Selection (Lottery) 54 Fed.
Reg. 11,416 (1989)([hereinafter Lottery NPRM]. Congress' reaction, however, has been less
than enthusiastic.
25. See, e.g., FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84 (1984)(denial of
[Vol. 38:299
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revise the regulatory scheme because the decision would have undermined
one of the cornerstones of the current system-the Commission's power to
regulate programming.26
The discussion then shifts to broadcasters' renewal expectancy.27 Under
the Commission's traditional renewal expectancy policy, the FCC has re-
warded broadcasters who have provided meritorious service to their commu-
nities with an advantage over challengers in a comparative hearing. G
observes that because content lies at the heart of the renewal expectancy,
and consideration of content would now be forbidden, broadcasters would
no longer enjoy the protection of the renewal expectancy and would become
vulnerable to competing applicants who present superior qualifications on
the criteria of integration, diversification, and minority and female owner-
ship. Red Lion H would also compel elimination of the defense of meritori-
ous programming to allegations of violations of the Commission's rules.28
B responds that the Commission legitimately could decide to renew ex-
isting broadcast licenses provided that the licensees complied with the Com-
mission's non-content related rules and policies, thereby assuring stability in
the industry.29 Although renewal in such a situation would be virtually au-
tomatic, that would not be much different from current practice, because
virtually no licensee has been denied renewal due to deficient programming.
G protests that, according to the case law, the Commission must take into
account the qualifications of competing applicants.3" But B claims that de-
spite the Commission's obligation to consider new applicants, it could never-
theless confer a renewal expectancy based on a licensee's knowledge of the
community, ascertainment of community needs and interests, and other
non-programming policies currently embodied in the renewal expectancy. 3 ,
B defends such a decision on the basis that marketplace forces will compel
federal funding to public broadcast stations for editorializing); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972)(denial of tenure as a result of teacher's criticism of state school).
26. Dyk, supra note 19, at 314.
27. A renewal expectancy is a presumption that a broadcaster is entitled to a renewal of
its license despite a superior showing by a competing applicant on other criteria that the Com-
mission has deemed important in the comparative hearing process, such as diversity of broad-
cast ownership, integration of ownership and management of the station, and minority and
female ownership. See, e.g, Central Fla. Enters. v. FCC, 683 F.2d 503 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1084 (1983). But see, Shurberg Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, No. 84-1600, slip
op. at I (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 1989) (minority distress sale program deprives broadcaster of
equal protection under the fifth amendment); Comparative Renewal Inquiry, supra note 13.
28. Dyk, supra note 19, at 314.
29. Id. at 314-15.
30. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945); Citizens Communications
Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
31. Dyk, supra note 19, at 315.
1989]
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broadcasters to offer news programming, whether or not the Commission
imposes such a requirement. Broadcast stations, like newspapers, says B,
sell a single product that they make more attractive by offering a range of
features, even if some of those features may themselves attract only a small
audience. Moreover, broadcasters can be expected to abide by journalistic
standards that the marketplace will reinforce, ensuring evenhandedness.32
G speculates that such a wrenching change in the foundations of broad-
cast regulation would invite the attention of Congress, which would never
tolerate a system that virtually immunizes broadcasters from challenge.
Broadcasters, G notes, have chalked up a terrible record in their dealings
with federal legislators. Legislators would have no inclination to assist the
industry when broadcasters have not upheld their side of the historical bar-
gain, but have instead pressed for the elimination of content regulation. B
responds that congressional anger would dissipate if the Supreme Court
sided with broadcasters, and that the decline in the power of the television
networks has mitigated legislators' concern.33
G objects that to entrench existing owners by conferring exclusive
franchises would be unconstitutional. The cable industry, he points out, de-
cided not to press for full first amendment rights because to gain such rights
could threaten its ability to secure legislative approval of exclusive
franchises. G adds that because the electromagnetic frequency remains a
scarce resource, the Constitution demands content-neutral allocation, for ex-
ample, by means of an auction or lottery. If existing licensees received re-
newals because of impermissible considerations of program content, the only
solution is to subject existing licensees to new applications. The unconstitu-
tional scheme harmed not only existing licensees, but also anyone who
wanted to enter the business.34
B and G then bicker over whether Red Lion II would force the govern-
ment to open broadcast frequencies to new bidders. B asserts that there is no
constitutional right to a broadcast license, and that in any event those who
seek to broadcast their views may purchase a station. G objects that existing
licensees received their permits under an unconstitutional system based on
content regulation. Because past government action has resulted in a pre-
ferred position for existing licensees, Congress would have to take some steps
to include those voices that had previously been excluded from the process.35
At that point in the hypothetical dialogue, B is joined by BB, who accuses
32. Id. at 316-17.
33. Id. at 317-19.
34. Id. at 319-20.
35. Id. at 320-22.
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G of threatening broadcasters with economic harm because of their decision
to press for full first amendment rights.a6 Licensing decisions have been es-
sentially content-neutral since 1965, he argues, and in anyevent Congress
could have granted perpetual licenses as an original matter. Moreover, BB
asserts, there is a compelling government interest for affirming current licen-
sees: industry stability. Broadcasters have invested billions of dollars in their
licenses, and their investments would be eliminated under G's approach.
New entities that obtained licenses would be unlikely to serve the public as
effectively as existing licensees, who have taken a long-term view of their
investment. The result would be to virtually destroy broadcasting at the
local level. The Supreme Court traditionally has declined to apply radically
new constitutional doctrines retroactively to avoid disturbance of substantial
investments.37
G suggests that Congress, at a minimum, could charge a spectrum fee, but
B responds that such a fee would constitute an improper selective tax on the
press. 38 After grudgingly conceding that the Supreme Court would proba-
bly uphold a statute confirming licenses in existing broadcasters or creating a
renewal expectancy based on factors other than program content, G asks
what would happen if Congress does not cooperate. BB concludes that it is
vital that broadcasters improve their relations with Congress.39
In sum, the dialogue suggests the author's view that, in the wake of Red
Lion HI, Congress would have statutory authority essentially to confirm ex-
isting licenses indefinitely by making them contingent only on compliance
with FCC rules and regulations related to matters other than program con-
tent. As a matter of legislative strategy, the author identifies the critical
issue as whether the failure of broadcasters to continue to press for full first
amendment protection will prolong their current vulnerability to congres-
sional pressure. Securing broader constitutional protections would alter the
prevailing congressional attitude and call into question not only program
regulation but other types of regulations that impose special requirements on
broadcasters. Mr. Dyk posits that broadcasters will be able to enhance their
reputation and influence only by continuing to urge the courts to grant them
full first amendment protections. 4°
36. Id. at 323.
37. Id. at 323-25.
38. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)(unconstitutional
for state to impose tax on general interest magazines but not on other specialized publications);
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983)(state
tax that singled out a few members of the press was unconstitutional).
39. Dyk, supra note 19, at 326-27.
40. Id. at 327-29.
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II. A RESPONSE
A decision as sweeping as Mr. Dyk proposes in Red Lion II would indeed
have far-reaching implications, and this Article does not purport to address
all of them. His dialogue does, however, rest on a number of questionable
assumptions. First, this Article discusses what gaining full first amendment
rights would mean in a system in which the FCC necessarily allocates fre-
quencies and issues licenses based on information content. Second, it ques-
tions whether Congress should or would rest regulatory policy on the need
to protect the stability of the broadcast industry.
A. Spectrum Scarcity, Frequency Allocation, and Content Regulation
The fundamental premise of Mr. Dyk's piece is that broadcasters should
be entitled to the protection of the first amendment to the same extent as the
print press. The Constitution, Mr. Dyk contends, intended to create a wall
between the government and the press. Government should not disturb edi-
torial decisions regardless of the nature of the medium involved. Accord-
ingly, a particular form of content regulation that is unconstitutional if
applied to the print press should also be unconstitutional if it constrains
broadcasters.4 '
To date, of course, the Supreme Court has never said that the first amend-
ment requires that all types of media be afforded the same level of constitu-
tional protection from government intrusion. To the contrary, the Court has
emphasized that "differences in the characteristics of new[ ] media justify
differences in the first amendment standards applied to them."'4 2 As Justice
Jackson observed, "The moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the
handbill, the sound truck, the street corner orator have differing natures,
values, abuses and dangers. Each... is a law unto itself."43 As a result, the
Court has taken widely different approaches when reviewing regulations that
affect newspapers," billboards,4" motion pictures,46 loudspeakers,47 and
41. Id. at 299-301.
42. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969).
43. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)(government con-
trol appropriate for one type of speech would not necessarily be valid if applied to other types
of speech).
44. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (overturning a state
statute's right-of-reply requirement as applied to newspapers).
45. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (regulation of billboards).
46. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)(screening of motion pictures by state cen-
sor board).
47. Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (striking down ordinance prohibiting opera-
tion of loudspeakers without a permit).
[Vol. 38:299
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cable television.48
In the area of broadcast regulation, the Supreme Court has granted the
FCC considerable leeway. Limitations on broadcast content that would be
unconstitutional if applied to the print press have been routinely upheld
when applied to broadcasting. 49 Although broadcasters have first amend-
ment rights, they are subordinate to the rights of the viewing public.5° A
reviewing court does not scrutinize broadcast regulation to determine
whether or not it supports a compelling government interest; rather, it will
sustain the regulation if it is "narrowly tailored to further a substantial gov-
ernmental interest." 51
The Court's ad hoc approach of tailoring its review of government regula-
tion to the particular medium at issue is not attributable to shortsightedness.
Broadcasting presents special' problems that belie simplistic analogies to the
print press. Specific regulations such as the Fairness Doctrine cannot be
wrenched from their historical and statutory context and dissected without
regard to the role they play in the overall public trustee regulatory model.
Spectrum scarcity-the shortage of electromagnetic frequencies available
for public use-has served as the traditional basis for permitting a relatively
extensive degree of government oversight of broadcast content. 52 During
the 1920's, far more people clamored to broadcast over the airwaves than the
spectrum could accommodate, and no one could be heard in the resulting
cacophony. The broadcast industry petitioned the government to regulate
the fledgling service to avoid total chaos. 53 In the Radio Act of 1927,"4 Con-
gress declined to utilize a system of government ownership of station facili-
ties, common carrier-type regulation, or a totally unregulated publishing
model. Instead, it opted for a system of government licensing where broad-
48. City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986)(Court
decided that cable television implicates first amendment interests, but declined to rule whether
print or broadcast standard was appropriate).
49. Compare CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981)(upholding limited right of access for fed-
eral candidates to broadcasting facilities in 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7)) with Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co: v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
50. "It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is
paramount." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
51. FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
52. Id. at 377 (quoting CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973)); FCC
v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978); CBS v. Democratic
Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 101; see Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
53. Herbert Hoover commented in 1924 that broadcasting was "probably the only indus-
try of the United States that is unanimously in favor of having itself regulated." S. HEAD,
BROADCASTING IN AMERICA: A SURVEY OF TELEVISION AND RADIO 126 (3d ed. 1976)(quot-
ing Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, 1924).
54. Ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 44 Stat.
1162.
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casters obtain limited rights to the use of electromagnetic frequencies condi-
tioned upon their compliance with certain public interest obligations.
Congress carried forward this general approach essentially unchanged in the
Communications Act of 1934. 55
From the beginning, federal officials took an active role in overseeing pro-
gram content. The Radio Act of 1927 required that stations choosing to
provide air time to political candidates also offer time to opposing candi-
dates.56 The Federal Radio Commission, the FCC's predecessor agency,
took the position that it was entitled to examine a broadcaster's past per-
formance and program content when considering whether to renew the
license. 7
The argument that interjecting the government into decisions of broadcast
program content inevitably leads to forbidden censorship received a full air-
ing in the period leading to the adoption of the landmark communications
legislation. Industry spokespersons asserted that the government should not
engage in censorship, and that broadcasters should have the same freedom of
speech enjoyed by the print press.5" Others contended that because limited
available spectrum would soon render it impossible for all interested appli-
cants to acquire broadcast stations, broadcasters should be subject to public
interest obligations and treated more like a common carrier.59 They further
maintained that "editorial privilege" becomes suspect if exercised under the
protective umbrella of a government license.6°
Fear that broadcast licensees would engage in private censorship and ex-
clude particular viewpoints from the airwaves offset concerns over govern-
ment censorship. Specific instances of such private censorship prompted
outcries of protest. Licensees themselves deemed subjects such as prostitu-
tion, birth control, cigarettes, and expression of certain political views un-
55. Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)).
56. Ch. 169, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)) (This
provision is known as the "equal opportunity requirement.").
57. "The [Federal Radio Commission believes it is entitled to consider the program ser-
vice rendered by the various applicants, to compare them and to favor those which render the
best service." 2 FRC ANN. REP. 160-61 (1928) quoted in I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREE-
DOM 123 (1983). As one contemporary commentator observed:
The standard of "public convenience and necessity" seems to afford a sufficiently
effective device to guarantee the freedom of the air. What the character of its pro-
gram is, and, more particularly, whether on controversial questions a station has
given fair representation to both sides would easily seem important elements in the
determination of whether or not it should be permitted to continue broadcasting.
Note, The Radio Act of 1927, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 726, 732 (1927).
58. See I. POOL, supra note 57, at 108.
59. Id. at 136-38.
60. See id. at 120-24.
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suitable for radio audiences. When AT&T was licensee of New York station
WEAF, for example, it ordered popular radio personality H.V. Kaltenborn
fired for criticizing Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes.6 Stations
barred speakers because of their political positions or chosen topics. Secre-
tary of Commerce Herbert Hoover recognized the risk of domination of the
broadcast medium by a few voices, testifying that "we can not allow any
single person or group to place themselves in [a] position where they can
censor the material which shall be broadcasted [sic] to the public.",62 The
resulting statutory system obligated broadcasters to use their licenses to
serve the public interest, but forbade the government from censoring pro-
gramming. 63 As the courts consistently held, however, regulators' consider-
ation of program content in licensing decisions did not constitute
censorship.'
61. Id.
62. Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the House Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisher-
ies, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924).
63. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1982).
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
Id.
64. In KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir.
1931), the D.C. Circuit upheld the denial of a license renewal to a station owner who gave
medical advice over the air and solicited patients for dubious surgical procedures involving
goat glands. The court explicitly rejected the claim that the denial was constitutionally forbid-
den censorship:
This contention is without merit. There has been no attempt on the part of the com-
mission to subject any part of appellant's broadcasting matter to scrutiny prior to its
release. In considering the question whether the public interest, convenience or ne-
cessity will be served by a renewal of appellant's license, the commission has merely
exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant's past conduct, which is not
censorship.
Id. In Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 62 F.2d 850 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 685 (1932), the court upheld the denial of a license renewal to a minister
who had used his station to broadcast anti-Catholic views. The court observed:
If... one in possession of a permit to broadcast in interstate commerce may ... use
these facilities ... to obstruct the administration of justice, offend the religious sus-
ceptibilities of thousands, inspire political distrust and civic discord . . . then this
great science, instead of a boon, will become a scourge .... This is neither censorship
nor previous restraint, nor is it a whittling away of the rights guaranteed by the First
Amendment .... Appellant may continue to indulge his strictures upon the charac-
ters of men in public office .... [b]ut he may not.., demand, of right, the continued
use of an instrumentality of commerce for such purposes ....
Id. at 852-53; see also Ansley v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 46 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1930) (refus-
ing to grant license where "much objectionable matter had been broadcast" by the station);
Chicago Fed'n of Labor v. Federal Radio Comm'n, 41 F.2d 422, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1930)(station
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The notion that spectrum scarcity justifies more active government regula-
tion of broadcast programming has come under sharp attack. The fact that
spectrum capacity is scarce, it is claimed, does not distinguish it from any
other economic resource. 65 Nor does it automatically require that the FCC
supervise the material broadcasters choose to air. This view casts the Com-
mission merely in the role of a traffic policeman, ensuring that stations do
not interfere with one another, but refusing to register any opinion on pro-
gram content.
The FCC's involvement in broadcast content, however, extends beyond
the surface programming requirements of the equal opportunity rule6 6 or the
personal attack doctrine.67 Consideration by the FCC of information con-
tent is inherent in the entire system of frequency allocation. When the FCC
allocates spectrum for particular uses, it dictates the nature of the informa-
tion that will be carried over those frequencies. As the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce reported when Congress attempted to reinstate the
Fairness Doctrine: "The rigid wall separating government and the printed
press does not exist [in broadcasting], since the Commission must, of neces-
sity, select among competing applicants for available broadcast frequencies,
and ensure that licensees abide by rules governing the use of these frequen-
cies. ' 61 When it allocates spectrum to cellular radio, land mobile service,
direct broadcast satellite, or public safety use, the Commission inevitably
decides among competing uses of those frequencies and determines the "con-
tent" of the information to be carried on the airwaves.
For example, the FCC has reserved Instructional Television Fixed Service
(ITFS) frequencies for instructional programming by educational institu-
tions, and has prescribed both the qualifications of entities eligible for those
licenses and the nature of the programming that may be carried by them.69
ITFS channels must be devoted primarily to the transmission of "instruc-
sought to improve its power; court observed that "[t]he past record of station WCFL has not
been above criticism").
65. See, e.g., Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3196 (1987).
66. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982); supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
67. The personal attack rule requires the broadcaster to offer a reasonable opportunity for
response to a person whose honesty, character or like personal qualities have been attacked
during a presentation of views on a controversial issue of public importance. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.1920 (1987); see also Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (rule applied); Polish American Congress v. FCC, 520 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1975) (same),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 927 (1976).
68. H.R. REP. No. 108, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) [hereinafter 1987 HOUSE
REPORT].
69. 47 C.F.R. §§ 74.901-.984 (1987). See Report and Order, Educational Television, 39
F.C.C. 846 (1963), recon. denied, 39 F.C.C. 873 (1964).
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tional and cultural material," and each channel must include formal educa-
tional material offered for credit to enrolled students.7° ITFS license
applications must be accompanied by program proposals, which Commis-
sion officials scrutinize to determine whether they legitimately further the
purposes of the educational television service.7 ' The Commission has also
authorized educational institutions to sublease those frequencies to commer-
cial entities, but has limited the number of hours during which the licensee
may devote the frequencies to this alternative programming.72 No less than
the Fairness Doctrine, these regulations represent a "content-based" restric-
tion on the speech rights of licensed entities, and the Commission dictates
what information may and may not be broadcast. Yet, no one has chal-
lenged the educational television licensing scheme on the ground that it im-
poses a constitutionally forbidden restraint on speech.
Why does it seem apparent that the government may dedicate a range of
frequencies for educational and instructional use and set programming re-
quirements for the use of those frequencies? Because electromagnetic fre-
quencies are a scarce public resource, the government has a substantial
interest in determining the nature of their use. Educational television fulfills
a public need that would in all likelihood be ignored in the absence of a
specific frequency allocation. Moreover, educational institutions applying
for instructional television licenses know exactly what they will get. In re-
turn for permission to use scarce frequencies, they agree to provide educa-
tional programming that complies with the Commission's guidelines and
serves the public's interest in obtaining educational instruction. Both sides
receive what they have bargained for, and the quid pro quo appears entirely
reasonable.73
Broadcast licenses come with strings attached. In return for their agree-
ment to comply with FCC rules and regulations, broadcasters, unlike news-
paper publishers, receive substantial protections. They receive free and
exclusive use of a valuable government resource that assures them a pathway
into the home. For many years, they were even guaranteed carriage on cable
systems.74 Other forms of communication receive no such subsidy. The
Supreme Court has found that the government may attach conditions to the
provision of government benefits, even where those conditions may involve
70. 47 C.F.R. § 74.931(a).
71. Id. § 74.932.
72. Id. § 74.931(e).
73. See CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting Office of Communication of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (a licensee is "granted
the free and exclusive use of a limited and valuable part of the public domain; when he accepts
that franchise it is burdened by enforceable public obligations")).
74. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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the relinquishment of constitutional rights.75
Yet, it is claimed, developments in the information marketplace have ren-
dered the scarcity basis for broadcast regulation obsolete, and the extensive
body of Supreme Court precedent conferring considerable discretion on the
Commission to impose a wide range of content limitations has lost its rele-
vance.76 Vast changes in the media marketplace over the last twenty years
assure the public access to a wide variety of information sources.
First, it is said, unlike the situation years ago when there were relatively
few broadcast stations, many television and radio stations are now licensed
and operating throughout the country.7 7 The fact remains, however, that
the demand for broadcast spectrum far exceeds the supply of frequencies
available. The economic value of existing licenses continues to soar, one
obvious indicator of a shortfall in supply.7" Moreover, demand for new sta-
tions continues unabated, requiring the Commission to continue to conduct
comparative hearings.7 9 Although the Commission in the 1985 Fairness Re-
port found a significant increase in the number of television stations, that
growth has been accompanied by a rise in the population and in the number
of groups seeking to use the spectrum. There are virtually no broadcast
channels available in the top markets, and any that are available are less
desirable Ultra High Frequency (UHF) channels.8" Plainly, a wide gap still
75. For example, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12-59 (1976), the Supreme Court struck
down limitations on campaign expenditures established by the Federal Election Commission
Act as violative of the first amendment. The Court concluded that these limitations impermis-
sibly infringed upon the right of candidates for public office to engage in constitutionally-
protected political activities. The Court then upheld identical spending limitations on candi-
dates who accepted public financing of their campaigns. Similarly, in Regan v. Taxation with
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 550 (1983), the Court upheld regulations that
conditioned the grant of a tax exemption on forbearance from constitutionally protected lobby-
ing activities. The Court observed that "[w]here governmental provision of subsidies is not
'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas'," id. (quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358
U.S. 498, 513 (1959)), "its 'power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public interest is
necessarily far broader.'" Id. (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 461, 476 (1977)); see also
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)(upholding constitu-
tionality of content-based restrictions on membership in government charitable fundraising
drive); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974)(government as proprietor of
transit system may prohibit political advertising on placards in buses).
76. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 3, at 202-08; Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC
Rcd 5043, 5053 (1987), aff'd on other grounds, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
78. See 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 13.
79. For example, 46 applicants filed for authorization to operate a new FM radio station
on Channel 255A in Orlando, Florida. FCC Notice, Report No. NA-28 (Feb. 12, 1987). In
recognition of the limits of the current system's capacity to process the glut of applicants
efficiently, the FCC recently proposed eliminating the hearing process and using lotteries to
select among basically qualified competing applicants. Lottery NPRM, supra note 23.
80. 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 15. Although in 1985 the Commission re-
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exists between the amount of spectrum available and the level of demand-
the criterion identified as significant by the Supreme Court. 81
Critics of the spectrum theory also cite the development of alternative
video distribution technologies, such as cable television, multichannel multi-
point distribution service, satellite master antenna systems, videocassette re-
corders (VCR's), and other technologies.82 They assert that broadcast
information cannot be viewed in isolation from other media. Broadcasters
face competition daily from published newspapers, cable television, and new
technologies, as well as from alternative forms of entertainment provided by
motion pictures and VCR's. They also point to the decline in network domi-
nance and the rise of independent stations. Surely this, they assert, has elim-
inated the need for any oversight of broadcast content.
The effect of these new technologies, however, has been limited. The in-
fluence of broadcasting remains enormously powerful, and the popularity of
free, over-the-air broadcasting as a means of reaching the American people
remains undiminished. The percentage of the public that relies exclusively
on television as its source of news has risen dramatically. It is not surprising
that for many years more people have cited television as their primary
source of news than any other source. Moreover, the number of people who
report that they rely on television exclusively for their news recently reached
fifty percent for the first time.8 3 Twenty years ago-when the court decided
Red Lion-only twenty-five percent of the population relied exclusively on
television for their news. By 1980, that statistic had increased to thirty-nine
percent.81 "In 1959, 42 percent of Americans surveyed reported getting
their news from two or more sources equally[; in contrast, n]ow, only 16
percent say they use two or more sources."
85
Not only is television an increasingly dominant purveyor of news and in-
formation, but the viewing public also perceives it as the most credible news
ported that there were 63 very high frequency (VHF) vacancies in the top 50 radio markets,
only UHF offers any commercial vacancies. Id.
81. See generally Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396-400 (1969)(dis-
cussion of congested airwaves); see also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION 662 (1970) (television is "scarcer" than the print press because the significant comparison
is the number of available broadcast outlets versus the number of persons who wish to use
broadcast facilities, not the number of newspapers versus the number of stations).
82. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 3, at 208-17; see also Syracuse Peace Council, 2
FCC Rcd 5043, 5053-54 (1987)(substitute technologies), aff'd on other grounds, 867 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1989); Fowler & Brenner, supra note 17, at 225-26 (scarcity does not "recognize the
substitutes for over-the-air distribution").
83. TIO/RoPER, AMERICA'S WATCHING: PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD TELEVISION 4
(1987).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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source, by a margin that has steadily grown." The credibility of television
news plausibly may be attributed to a public perception that broadcasters
generally present a spectrum of viewpoints in the context of individual news
stories. Aside from journalistic professionalism, requirements such as the
Fairness Doctrine have reinforced and nurtured this instinctual presentation
of balanced views.
The widely touted emergence of new communications technologies has
had little practical effect on viewing alternatives available to the public.
Such services as Satellite Master Antenna Television (SMATV), low power
television, and Multichannel Multipoint Distribution Systems (MMDS) offer
alternatives more in theory than in practice, and they have had no significant
effect on the video marketplace.87 Of the new technologies, only cable televi-
sion has had a measurable impact. However, for the less than half of United
States households that have cable service,88 that medium has served primar-
ily as a means of delivering entertainment programming or broadcast sig-
nals, rather than originating news or informational programming.8 9
In view of the continued spectrum scarcity and the undiminished need for
the FCC to allocate frequencies and make licensing decisions, the implica-
tions of a declaration that broadcasters have full first amendment rights re-
main far from clear.9 ° Certainly the theoretical foundation for the equal
86. Id. at 5.
87. See 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 15-16.
88. BROADCASTING-CABLE YEARBOOK 1988, A-2 (49.8% of television homes have
cable).
89. The sole exception is Cable News Network (CNN), which offers twenty-four hour
news service to cable subscribers. CNN viewership is likely to be more fractionalized, how-
ever, than that of similar broadcast offerings because it represents only one of many channels
available to cable customers. In addition, the fact that fewer than half of U.S. households
subscribe to cable service, see id., makes it difficult for a cable offering such as CNN, by itself,
to significantly affect the predominant position of the networks in the provision of news and
information. Moreover, CNN primarily covers national events; broadcast stations remain the
sole source of television and radio news responsive to the needs and interests of particular
localities.
90. As the Commission has pointed out, newspapers do not have full first amendment
privileges, in the sense that the Constitution does not "necessarily bar[ ] every regulation
which in any way affects what the newspapers publish." Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Amendment of Part 76 of the Commission's Rules Concerning Carriage of Television Broad-
cast Signals by Cable Television Systems, 2 FCC Rcd 3593, 3624 n.32, aff'd, Century Commu-
nications Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quoting Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d
1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969)). Newspapers may be forced to
satisfy certain content-related standards in order to obtain government benefits. For example,
newspapers must devote at least 25% of their space to news and editorials to secure a second-
class postage rate. UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DOMESTIC MAIL MANUAL, ISSUE 29
§§ 421, 422, 231(a) (eff. date Dec. 18, 1988)(requiring newspapers seeking second-class postage
rates to primarily disseminate news and information and contain no more than 75%
advertising).
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opportunities 9' and reasonable access9 2 provisions of the Communications
Act would weaken considerably, and probably give way altogether. The
Supreme Court sustained the reasonable access requirements in section
312(a)(7) on the grounds that they properly balance the first amendment
rights of federal candidates, the public, and broadcasters, and that they en-
hance the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, informa-
tion necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process.
9 3
Following the hypothetical Red Lion A, however, no such balancing would
be possible; the rights of broadcasters would override other factors in the
constitutional calculus.
Although broadcasters presumably would applaud the elimination of re-
ply and access requirements, a sweeping decision such as Red Lion H could
not be confined to the excision of specific programming regulations that
broadcasters consider objectionable. Interpreted literally, the principle that
no regulation of speech can be applied to broadcasters if it could not also be
applied to the print press could wipe out most of the FCC's regulations. It
would be difficult, for example, to justify under such a standard any restric-
tions on the time of day when broadcasters may deliver particular program-
ming, for such a regulation surely could not be applied to the print press.94
Restrictions on broadcasting of lottery information95 or tobacco advertise-
ments96 may also be vulnerable. 97 The Commission's qualification require-
ments for license eligibility would attract heightened scrutiny, since the
government imposes no such requirements on newspapers. Efforts to reserve
91. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1982)(licensee that permits use of station by candidates must af-
ford equal opportunity for use of station by other candidates); see supra notes 56-57 and ac-
companying text.
92. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1982)(license may be revoked for willful or repeated failure to
allow reasonable access to broadcast stations by political candidates).
93. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396-97 (1981).
94. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1987) (imposing limits on prime-time network
programming).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1982). Congress recently amended the provision banning broad-
casts of lottery information, permitting the broadcast of such information if the state in which
the station is located does not prohibit lottery advertising. See Charity Games Advertising
Clarification Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-625, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102
Stat.) 3205 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1301 note).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1982).
97. Although Mr. Dyk limits his article to issues of "pure" political speech, the line be-
tween commercial and political information is not always easily drawn. To declare that broad-
casters have full first amendment rights could render suspect the restriction on advertisement
of tobacco products, which currently applies only to electronic media. Id. Although the
Supreme Court has ruled that commercial speech is entitled to a less stringent degree of pro-
tection than core political speech, Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S.
328, 340 (1986), the extent to which the government may discriminate among types of media
when regulating commercial speech remains unclear.
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a portion of the spectrum for promoting educational and noncommercial
interests could be questioned because these, too, would be "content-based."
Indeed, it is not inconceivable that Red Lion H1 would throw into doubt the
entire system of FCC frequency allocation, since by assigning frequencies the
Commission necessarily determines the content of what is to be sent over the
airwaves.
Such a sweeping ruling would also call into question the fundamental re-
quirement that broadcasters serve the public interest. Following such a rul-
ing, it is hard to see how the government could demand that a broadcaster
serve its community of license. Because newspapers are not required to pro-
mote anyone's interests but their own, to require broadcasters to do so
would deny them their full constitutional rights. Even critics of the spec-
trum scarcity theory appear uncomfortable with the notion that broadcasters
would have no public interest obligations. In eliminating the Fairness Doc-
trine, for example, the Commission took pains to note that it was not ques-
tioning the public interest basis for broadcast regulation.9" But once
Pandora's box is opened, it may be impossible to salvage any vestige of the
public interest standard.
To declare invalid all content regulation of broadcasting might also expose
broadcasters to greater political pressure. Requirements such as the Fair-
ness Doctrine, equal time and reasonable access insulate broadcasters from
those who might be tempted to use political power to persuade them to air a
single point of view or to carry a presentation featuring only one political
candidate. They can point to their public interest responsibilities as FCC
licensees as a basis for declining such requests. Indeed, by vesting the func-
tions of the FCC in an independent agency, free of the control of the Execu-
tive Branch, Congress revealed its desire to prevent arm-twisting of
broadcasters by those who exercise political power. To wipe away the pano-
ply of reply requirements would leave the broadcast industry vulnerable to
such pressures.
Mr. Dyk stops short of asserting that broadcasters should be subject to no
public interest requirements. The obligation that broadcasters provide pro-
gramming responsive to the needs of the community, he speculates, might
pass muster under the Constitution even if broadcasters have full first
amendment rights, both because such a requirement would not have the
chilling effect of other content-specific regulations such as the Fairness Doc-
trine, and because it would merely confirm what the ethical standards of
98. Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd 5043, 5048-52 (1987), aff'd on nonconstitutional
grounds, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The fact that government may not impose unconsti-
tutional conditions on the receipt of a public benefit does not preclude the Commission's abil-
ity, and obligation, to license broadcasters in the public interest, convenience and necessity.").
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journalism already require.99 It is unlikely, however, that the Constitution
could support such finely drawn distinctions. Critics of the Fairness Doc-
trine consistently objected to the policy, but not because it required balanced
coverage of controversial issues. This requirement, they asserted, was al-
ready incorporated in journalistic ethical standards."° The complaint was
that the government, and not broadcasters or the public, decided the appro-
priate level and type of news coverage. But a decision by the FCC that a
broadcaster's programming has not responded to community needs repre-
sents no less of an intrusion into the broadcaster's editorial role than a ruling
that the broadcaster's coverage of controversial issues has been unbalanced.
B. Industry Stability, Private Markets, and the Public Interest
Mr. Dyk's dialogue suggests that a decision as sweeping as Red Lion 11
need not trigger chaos. The need to maintain industry stability, he asserts,
would justify either a decision by the Commission to expand broadcasters'
renewal expectancy based on nonprogramming factors, or would support
legislative changes by Congress that would confirm licenses for existing
licensees for indefinite periods, assuming they continue to comply with tech-
nical FCC regulations. The first amendment, he claims, does not demand
that existing broadcasters be stripped of their licenses and their
investments. 10"
The author's suggestion that licensees be granted "squatters' rights," how-
ever, would turn the Communications Act on its head. One of the primary
purposes of the Communications Act was to vest ownership of the airwaves
in the federal government. 0 2 Pursuant to the Communications Act, re-
newal applicants waive any claim to "rights" in any particular frequency
arising from previous use of the frequency. 103 Although licensees typically
invest large amounts in the development of their license, they do so with the
knowledge that the security of the investment depends upon compliance
with the FCC's rules and regulations, which are subject to change, and that
the investment could be lost if the Commission revokes or declines to renew
the license."
99. Dyk, supra note 19, at 311-12.
100. RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASSOCIATION, CODE OF BROADCAST NEWS
ETHICS (1987) states that its members will "[s]trive to present the source or nature of broad-
cast news material in a way that is balanced, accurate and fair." Id.
101. Dyk, supra note 19, at 323-26.
102. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1982)(one purpose of the Communications Act is "to maintain the
control of the United States over all channels of interstate radio transmission").
103. 47 U.S.C. § 304 (1982).
104. Cf RKO Gen., Inc. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(upholding denial of li-
cense renewal where licensee had violated FCC regulations), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
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To be sure, the courts have recognized that it would disserve the public
interest to subject licensees to the threat of license withdrawal despite their
provision of superior service to the community of license. 105 But to confirm
licenses automatically in existing licensees would effectively insulate broad-
casters from competition and preclude the Commission from administering
the license allocation system to accomplish other public interest objectives.
As early as 1933, in Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mort-
gage Co., 106 the Supreme Court upheld a decision by the Commission termi-
nating the licenses of several existing broadcast stations to achieve a more
equitable geographic distribution of licenses. The Court observed that
broadcasters "had no right superior to the exercise of this power of regula-
tion," and that they "necessarily made their investments and their contracts
in the light of, and subject to, this paramount authority."' 0 7 In FCC v.
Sanders Bros. Radio Station,1"8 the Court noted explicitly that "it is not the
purpose of the [Communications] Act to protect a licensee against competi-
tion but to protect the public."10 9 More recently, in FCC v. National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting,110 the Court upheld Commission
regulations prohibiting cross-ownership of newspapers and broadcast sta-
tions and requiring divestiture in certain cases.
The distinction between policies that ensure an appropriate level of indus-
try stability, and those that go too far in shielding broadcasters from compet-
itive forces, is not easy to identify. In Carroll Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, "'
the D.C. Circuit found that the Commission could consider economic injury
to an existing broadcast station when deciding whether to allow new entry, a
ruling that appeared to conflict with the spirit if not the letter of the
Supreme Court's earlier holding in Sanders Bros. The Commission later
adopted regulations that impaired the development of technological alterna-
105. See, e.g., FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 804-09
(1978); Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1213 n.35 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
106. 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
107. Id. at 282.
108. 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
109. Id. at 475.
110. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
111. 258 F.2d 440 (D.C. Cir. 1958). The Commission has abolished what had come to be
known as the Carroll doctrine. See Report and Order, Policies Regarding Detrimental Effects
of Proposed New Broadcast Stations on Existing Stations, 3 FCC Rcd 638 (1987). Noting that
it had never denied a license application on the basis of Carroll doctrine principles, id. at 638,
the Commission determined that consideration of economic impact on existing licensees, as
required by Carroll, disserves the public interest. Id. at 639. The Commission held that the
economic theory of "ruinous competition" underlying Carroll has since been discredited. Id.
at 640. The Commission concluded that Carroll conflicts with its policy of allowing market
forces, rather than government regulations, to control the programming activities of mass me-
dia industries. Id. at 640.
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tives to broadcasting, such as cable and subscription television. Although
the Commission subsequently abandoned this approach,112 the courts still
on occasion chastise the Commission for regulatory decisions that protect
broadcasters at the expense of the public." 13
Marketplace proponents respond that the threat of license loss has never
provided an effective competitive spur to improve performance. They argue
that regulatory fiat will never assure responsiveness to public interests and
concerns as effectively as unfettered discretion to select programming that
broadcasters believe will attract and retain audiences in the face of competi-
tion from other broadcasters and from alternative video technologies and
entertainment forms. For example, at one point in the dialogue in Mr.
Dyk's article, B asserts that content regulation of broadcasters is unneces-
sary because marketplace forces will ensure that broadcasters will continue
to air news and informational programming.1 14
The theory that free markets have displaced the need for government reg-
ulation has become popular in the 1980's, not only in the field of communi-
cations but also in other industries. The marketplace approach to broadcast
regulation springs from the view that consumers are best off when society's
resources are allocated in a manner that permits them to seek their wants
and desires as fully as possible. Removal of barriers to entry promotes social
utility by preventing a firm or group of firms from dominating markets, and
by creating conditions that enable pricing of goods as close as possible to
their costs of production. By casting broadcasters in the role of marketplace
competitors, rather than public trustees, the argument runs, broadcasters
will provide the public with the programming they desire, which would en-
hance social utility without the need for affirmative regulation." 5
In many situations market forces become a highly effective tool to pro-
mote consumer welfare, an important component of the public interest. In a
variety of areas, the FCC has successfully unleashed private economic forces
to supplant regulation where experience has shown that approach to be un-
wise and counterproductive. For example, in telephone, the Commission
112. See Report, Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 71 F.C.C.2d 951
(1979); Report, Inquiry into the Economic Relationship Between Television Broadcasting and
Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979); Memorandum Opinion and Order, Cable Television
Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 652 (1980), aff'd sub nor. Malrite T.V. v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
113. See Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); National Ass'n of
Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("existing licensees] have no
entitlement that permits them to deflect competitive pressure from innovative and effective
technology.").
114. Dyk, supra note 19, at 316-17.
115. See generally Fowler & Brenner, supra note 17.
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has trimmed regulation of new common carriers that now offer competitive
alternatives to established service providers, and the public has benefitted
from access to a wider range of products and services at competitive
prices." 6 In cable television, the Commission has done away with regula-
tions that primarily served to protect broadcasters from competition while
offering no public interest benefits. 1
7
Markets, however, do not offer a talismanic solution to the problems of
broadcast regulation." 8 A perfectly competitive industry is one in which
there exists ease of entry and exit and a large number of competitors, none of
whom alone has sufficient market power to influence price. Yet the element
of free entry and exit is absent from broadcasting. The enormous demand
for scarce radio frequencies, and the inevitability of interference without
government intervention, force the federal government to allocate spectrum
for particular uses. Because the broadcast industry is not and cannot be
purely competitive, introducing market forces on a selective basis does not
necessarily produce the results predictable under a pure competition model.
Marketplace proponents point out that the possibility of resale mitigates
some of the effects of the barriers to entry created by the system of frequency
allocation. It is possible, they suggest, to purchase a radio or television sta-
tion on the open market. An active marketplace in the purchase and sale of
broadcast facilities currently thrives, prodded in no small part by the deregu-
latory actions of the last decade. But prices for these stations have reached
staggering levels, reflecting both the fact that licensees are assured exclusive
use of government-owned frequencies, and that deregulation has expanded
the number of stations a single entity may hold.' The possibility of station
resale does nothing to increase the number of frequencies available. To the
contrary, it serves the interests of those who have gained access to a fre-
quency to restrict as much as possible its availability to potential competing
116. See, e.g., Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, Amendment of Section 64.702
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, 61 F.C.C.2d 103 (1976); Supplemental Notice of
Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking, 64 F.C.C.2d 771 (1977); Tentative Deci-
sion and Further Notice of Inquiry and Rulemaking, 72 F.C.C.2d 358 (1979); Final Decision,
77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1979), aff'd on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), on further partial
reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), aff'd sub nom. Computer and Communications In-
dus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
118. See generally Deregulation Has Gone Too Far, Many Telling New Administration,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
119. See 1987 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 68, at 13 (the value of stations has greatly in-
creased over the past thirty years); see also Report and Order, Repeal of the "Regional Con-
centration of Control" Provisions of the Commission's Multiple Ownership Rules, 101 F.C.C.
2d 402 (1984)(to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (d)-(f))(Commission's repeal of previous
restriction on the number of stations one entity may hold).
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users. 120
Even if the broadcast industry did operate in a perfectly competitive man-
ner, complete reliance on market forces would be unlikely to generate pro-
gramming that serves the public interest. There are many examples of
situations in which regulatory action has been necessary to check undesir-
able effects resulting from unfettered operation of the market. The area of
obscenity and indecency provides a classic example. At the same time that
the Commission has embraced the marketplace as a justification for elimi-
nating the Fairness Doctrine, it has aggressively enforced sanctions for viola-
tions of statutory and regulatory restrictions on the broadcast of indecent
and obscene matter by licensees exercising their editorial discretion to satisfy
the desires of the public. 12'
The impoverished state of children's television offers another case of un-
checked market forces at work. For years the Commission maintained spe-
cific guidelines on the permissible level of commercialization in children's
programming and strict requirements that broadcasters maintain adequate
separation between program content and commercial messages. 122 When
the Commission eliminated these limitations on children's advertising as
120. There is yet another problem with applying competition theory to broadcasting. The
"customers" of broadcasters are not viewers, but rather advertisers who purchase space on
programs. Viewers pay nothing to view broadcast programming. Although advertisers may
pay higher rates for programming that attracts a higher audience level, the interjection of an
intermediate level of advertisers between programmers and viewers makes it unlikely that pro-
gramming will fully reflect viewers' preferences.
121. Until 1987, the Commission had interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)
to prohibit broadcast of obscene programming during the entire day and indecent program-
ming only when there was a reasonable risk that children would be in the audience, which the
Commission considered to be before 10:00 p.m. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975), aff'd,
438 U.S. 726 (1978). In 1987, however, the Commission decided that broadcasts of indecent
material would not be permitted until after 12:00 midnight. Pacifica Found., 2 FCC Rcd 2698
(1987); Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 FCC Rcd 2703 (1987); Infinity Broadcasting Corp., 2
FCC Rcd 2705 (1987), on recon., 3 FCC Rcd 930 (1987), aff'd in part and remanded in part
sub nom. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Action
for Children's Television, the court of appeals affirmed a Commission ruling that a morning
broadcast violated § 1464, but it remanded two other rulings regarding post- 10 p.m. broad-
casts for a further explanation justifying its "new, more restrictive channeling approach." Id.
at 1334. On October 1, 1988, the President signed legislation which required the Commission
to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1464 on a 24 hour per day basis; Dep'ts of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459,
§ 608, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2186, 2228; and the Commission
adopted an order complying with this legislation on December 21, 1988. Order, Broadcast
Services; Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Obscenity and Indecency in 18
U.S.C. § 1464 on Twenty-four Hour Per Day Basis, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,425 (1988)(to be codified
at 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999). As a result, the ban on the broadcast of indecent material now
applies twenty-four hours per day.
122. See Children's Television Report and Policy Statement, 50 F.C.C.2d 1, 15-16 (1974).
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part of a general program of deregulating the commercial and programming
content of television, 123 the level of advertising increased dramatically and
the D.C. Circuit ordered the Commission to provide a more detailed justifi-
cation for its sudden change in policy.' 24 With the support of the National
Association of Broadcasters, Congress overwhelmingly passed legislation
that would have limited advertising during children's programming to 10.5
minutes an hour on weekends and twelve minutes an hour on weekdays.
President Reagan, however, vetoed the bill. 1
25
The rapid rise of "shock" or tabloid television offers the most recent sign
of the effects of unfettered market forces. In a quest for higher ratings, some
broadcasters have resorted to increasingly lurid news reports and confronta-
tional talk show formats. Networks have reduced their internal staffs de-
voted to maintaining broadcast standards, leading to greatly liberalized
portrayals of sexually graphic material.' 2 6 Rather than generating a wider
range of programming choices for the public, the newly competitive market-
place appears, at least in some cases, to generate programming that falls to
the lowest common denominator that will attract the largest audience.
None of this means, of course, that the government should step in and
monitor day-to-day programming and editorial decisions of broadcasters. It
does suggest, however, that one may legitimately express skepticism at the
incantation of market forces as the alternative to all content regulation. It is
unlikely that competitive pressures alone will cause a wide variety of public
affairs programming to be aired in the absence of specific consumer demand
for such programming. Even in an era of technological change, government
appropriately may maintain a limited role in overseeing broadcast content,
as a means to ensure that users of broadcast frequencies serve the public
interest.
In fact, the solution proposed by Mr. Dyk's article-exclusive and essen-
tially permanent franchises for existing broadcasters that abide by the Com-
mission's technical rules-would be wholly inconsistent with a marketplace
123. Report and Order, Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascer-
tainment Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations,
98 F.C.C.2d 1076 (1984).
124. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 821 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
125. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Children's Television Act of 1988, 24 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1456 (Nov. 5, 1988). Reagan Vetoes Bill Putting Limits on TV Program-
ming for Children, N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1988, at Al, col. I.
126. See, e.g., Why Sparks Flew in Retelling the Tale of Flight 007, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28,
1988, at H3, col. 1 (noting cutbacks in network censorship departments in recent months);
Mann, NBC Steps Over the Line, Wash. Post, Nov. 9, 1988, at C3, col. 4 ("If the networks
don't come to their senses pretty quickly about [sexually explicit programming], they are going
to find themselves fighting off a drive for censorship that will have unprecedented popular
appeal.").
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model. Relaxing restrictions on the length of the license term could signifi-
cantly enhance a license's value. Rather than facilitating entry into the
broadcast industry, a conclusive renewal expectancy would make access to
broadcast frequencies by outside entrants even more difficult.
If the Court in Red Lion 11 were to sweep away broadcasters' public inter-
est obligations, Congress would face a troubling decision. The legislature
could legitimately ask whether broadcasters should continue to receive regu-
latory treatment that confers competitive advantages on the industry over
other media. Congress might favor preserving a modicum of free, over-the-
air local broadcast programming. 2 7 But Congress could also decide that
broadcasters should no longer receive free use of the electromagnetic fre-
quencies if they are not obliged to serve the public in return. An auction of
those frequencies to the highest bidder, or imposition of a spectrum fee to
compensate the government for the use of the frequencies, seems a logical
solution.
A decision to assess broadcasters fees for use of the spectrum, either by
auction or through fees on existing licenses, would not have the drastic con-
sequences foreseen by Mr. Dyk. Broadcasters with existing licenses could
preserve their status if they are willing to pay as much as the next highest
bidder. In those situations where broadcasters were unwilling to pay the
necessary amounts, the influx of new ownership into the broadcast industry
could be a healthy influence. 2 ' The contention in Mr. Dyk's dialogue that
new licensees would exercise more of a short-range view than existing licen-
sees is unpersuasive.' 29 If Congress combined an auction or spectrum fee
arrangement with a long-term license, the licensee would be able to make
substantial investments confident of a low risk of license loss.
In Mr. Dyk's piece, BB contends that Congress could not assess existing
broadcasters a spectrum fee or conduct an auction for those licenses without
violating the Constitution.' 30 Such a fee, the article claims, would represent
punishment of broadcasters for assertion of their first amendment rights.
This cramped interpretation of the Constitution probably would not con-
strain the Congress. If the Court declares invalid the statutory conditions
upon free use of a government resource established by the Communications
Act, nothing would prevent Congress from reallocating those resources on
127. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1982)(Congress enacted the Communications Act in part for the
purpose of promoting a system of wire and radio communications "at reasonable charges.").
128. Cf Tender Offers and Proxy Contests, 59 Rad. Reg. 2d (P&F) 1536, 1539-40
(1986)(suggesting that broadcast industry benefits from changes in ownership), petition for re-
view dismissed, 826 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
129. Dyk, supra note 19, at 325.
130. Id. at 323-36.
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the basis of their considerable market value. Nor could such a decision be
challenged on the ground that it discriminates between broadcasters and
other types of media that pay no such fees;' 3' those other forms of media
make no use of electromagnetic frequencies and therefore do not receive the
same level and type of government benefits.
If anything, the importance of preserving the stability of the broadcast
industry points to retention, not rejection, of the sixty-year-old public trustee
model. The system of broadcast regulation has evolved slowly, as the courts
and the Commission have struggled to balance the first amendment rights of
broadcasters against their responsibilities to the public. To topple that sys-
tem with a sweeping declaration that the public interest requirement has no
substantive content would only generate widespread uncertainty over the fu-
ture of the industry.
III. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether to accede to Congress' wishes on the Fairness Doc-
trine deeply divides the broadcast community. 132 Mr. Dyk's view is that
broadcasters should continue to press the courts to confer full first amend-
ment protections. Success, he contends, will enhance broadcasters' reputa-
tion and their ability to persuade Congress of the correctness of their
position.' 33 Many broadcasters endorse this view, fearing that concession on
this issue will subject them to more intrusive federal regulation at a later
date. Others, however, believe that the battle over the Fairness Doctrine has
little point. They already provide balanced coverage of controversial issues,
and therefore do not believe that codification of the Doctrine would affect
their daily editorial decisions. As a practical matter, they realize that Con-
gress has made clear in no uncertain terms that broadcasters will not achieve
progress in other important areas until they agree to a version of the Fair-
ness Doctrine. '34
The image of the broadcast industry has been tarnished not because the
courts have declined to confer on the industry full first amendment rights,
but rather because broadcasters' invocation of the Constitution tends to be
selective. When programming requirements affecting them are at issue,
broadcasters attack these obligations as an interference with their first
amendment rights. When the free exercise of constitutional rights by other
media would undermine broadcasters' preferred position, however, the
131. Cf Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987)(striking down as
unconstitutional tax that applied to certain publications and not others).
132. See supra notes 16, 23 and accompanying text.
133. Dyk, supra note 19, at 327-29.
134. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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broadcast industry is quick to invoke the shield of the public trustee doctrine
to attempt to restrict competing technologies.'
35
For the past sixty years, Congress has offered free and exclusive use of
electromagnetic frequencies in return for broadcasters' agreement to fulfill
certain minimal public interest responsibilities. A limited degree of govern-
ment oversight of content appropriately balances the rights of broadcasters
and the viewing public, and is inherent in the public trustee system of broad-
cast regulation. In the event the courts grant broadcasters full first amend-
ment freedoms and strike down all obligations to serve the public interest,
broadcasters will discover that they have gained a pyrrhic victory. Congress
would likely not allow broadcasters to jettison their public interest obliga-
tions while continuing to enjoy the benefits of subsidized transmission capa-
bility. Some form of auction or spectrum fee would probably result. This
would not, as Mr. Dyk's article suggests, constitute punishment for asserting
constitutional rights; it would merely represent an appropriate response to
the disruption of the traditional bargain that has governed broadcasting for
the past sixty years. The public interest would be better served if broadcast-
ers and Congress could work together to improve the regulatory process
while preserving the fundamental tenets of the public trustee model.
135. In the battle over the must-carry rules, for example, broadcasters consistently down-
played the first amendment rights of cable operators on the ground that those rights were
subordinate to the public's interest in preserving free, over-the-air local broadcasting. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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